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EXCUSES, JUSTIFICATIONS, AND DURESS 
AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS 
Noam Wiener* 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the application of the defense of duress by 
international criminal tribunals through analyzing opposing the-
oretical approaches to justifications and excuses. The purpose of 
this examination is twofold. First, the article offers a framework 
for duress’s application by examining scholarly approaches to du-
ress and by analyzing the application of the defense by interna-
tional tribunals. This analysis includes the tribunals constituted 
following the Second World War and International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Second, the article pro-
vides insight into the underlying rationales that guide judges at 
the international tribunals in the last decade through the judges’ 
application of the defense. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the application of the defense of du-
ress by international criminal tribunals by exploring the crimi-
nal law paradigms (consequentialist or deontological) to which 
the judges at these tribunals adhere. The premise of this article 
is that although judges and other practitioners may consider 
the differences between deontological and consequentialist ap-
proaches to punishment academic or theoretical, the result of 
acting according to one paradigm or the other significantly 
changes the result of the criminal trial. Following a detailed 
analysis of the defense of duress and the different ways it can 
be applied as an excuse or a justification by deontologists and 
consequentialists, the article concludes that judges at the 
Nürnberg Military Tribunals following the Second World War 
(NMTs) applied duress from a deontological perspective, while 
judges today approach the defense from a consequentialist an-
gle. 
During the guilt stage of the trial, judges are mostly con-
cerned with the actions and the corresponding mental state of 
the accused, i.e. with the perpetrator’s culpability. At the sen-
tencing stage, however, judges often concern themselves with a 
wide variety of factors:  the effects of sentencing on society, the 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/4
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character of the perpetrator, and his chances of rehabilitation.1 
By focusing on the criminal act (actus reus), and whether it was 
committed with the requisite intent (mens rea), the judges ask 
whether the defendant is indeed culpable of the crime with 
which he has been charged. This is, as will be elaborated on be-
low, a deontological retributive approach to criminal law. Thus, 
even judges who do not normally approach criminal law from a 
deontological perspective, at this stage of the trial they are con-
strained within the retributive paradigm.2  
However, exceptions to this rule exist in the form of de-
fenses. Examining the exceptions in order to study the rule has 
a long tradition in legal philosophy. As Peter Westen argues, “a 
unitary theory of criminal excuses [is the] mother lode of crim-
inal responsibility scholarship.”3 This article will not attempt to 
provide a unitary theory of criminal excuses. But it will at-
tempt to comprehend the way the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) understands guilt by 
examining the manner in which it has applied the duress de-
fense.  
Among the various criminal defenses, duress is particular-
ly contentious. This contention does not arise because of disa-
greement regarding the validity of duress, but because of the 
lack of agreement on the conditions that allow the use of duress 
as a defense, and, more basically, because no consensus exists 
as to whether it is an excuse or a justification.4 Different and 
distinctive approaches to the defense of duress stem from con-
sequentialist and from retributivist approaches to punishment, 
and by examining the manner in which the ICTY has decided 
to apply the defense, one should be able to gain insight to the 
approach that guide judges as they apply duress in one way or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of 
Pound: An Essay on Criminal Justice 93 MICH. L.R. 1915, 1923 (1995).  
2 The most notable attempt to inject consequentialist social factors to the 
guilt stage in the United States in the last fifty years was Judge Bazelon’s 
“rotten social background” doctrine, which failed to gain a foothold in Ameri-
can jurisprudence; see David Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 39 
S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976).  
3 Peter Westen, An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 25 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 
289 (2006). 
4 Peter Westen and James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: 
A Justification, Not an Excuse – and Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 833, 
945 (2003). 
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another.    
Following this introduction, in section B the article pro-
vides a very brief exposition of the difference between the con-
sequentialist and the deontological approaches to criminal law 
and explains why deontological retributivism is the more con-
vincing justification for punishment. Section C examines the 
definition of duress, mainly in regards to the severity of the 
threats that can create duress, and the scope of the crimes for 
which it can provide an excuse. Section C(i) begins with brief 
comparative account of various statutes that define duress, be-
fore examining the defense as it is described in the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court. Following the exami-
nation of the statutory language, the article concludes that 
understanding the different approaches to duress necessitates 
determining if it is to be applied as an excuse or as a justifica-
tion. Thus, Section C(ii), distinguishes between these two types 
of defenses. Section D reexamines the defense of duress as ei-
ther an excuse or a justification, and describes how it would be 
applied in each circumstance. Having provided the theoretical 
background, section E examines how the NMTs applied the de-
fense in cases brought before it in the 1940s, and how the ICTY 
applied the defense in the Erdemović case. Finally, section F, 
concludes by suggesting how the lessons of the Erdemović case 
may be used when the question of duress arises again before 
international criminal tribunals.  
B. THE DEONTOLOGICAL RETRIBUTIVISM AND THE 
CONSEQUENTIALISM, TWO PARADIGMATIC APPROACHES TO 
CRIMINAL LAW 
The deontological retributivist and the consequentialist 
criminal law paradigms provide distinct approaches to the 
question “why punish,” and accordingly provide different an-
swers to dilemmas that arise in the process of determining 
whether and how much to punish.5 The discussion below exam-
ines how applying the defense of duress would be affected by 
the choice of different approaches to criminal law; but to better 
understand the discussion, a brief explanation of each criminal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE, THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS, 6 
(1976). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/4
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law paradigm is provided.  
In broad brush strokes, two paradigms or approaches to 
criminal law have been put forth by criminal law theorists. One 
paradigmatic perspective on criminal law is consequentialism, 
which justifies punishment by the good consequences that the 
punishment creates.6 Among consequentialists there are those 
who favor deterrence as the most important rationale for sen-
tencing,7 others favor incapacitation,8 expressivism,9 or reha-
bilitation.10 These consequentialist justifications for punish-
ment do conflict with each other at times, and do not always 
bring about the same results. Thus, for example, punishment 
that aims to rehabilitate may not be severe enough to deter, or 
punishment that is severe enough to deter may not be suffi-
cient to express a sufficient amount of opprobrium required to 
fulfill an expressivist goal.11 However, common to all these jus-
tifications is the principle that punishment is not justified in-
and-of-itself, but rather that it is an evil that should only be 
used because, as a result of its use, some beneficial conse-
quences will be attained in the future.12 Thus, to consequential-
ists, even though punishment is harmful and causes pain, it is 
necessary because it may prevent greater pain and harm in the 
future.13 That is, punishment is only morally justified as long 
as the costs incurred are no greater than the benefits that will 
be attained.14 
The other paradigmatic perspective of criminal law is de-
ontological retributivism. Deontologists claim that for an action 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishment, in ALLESANDRO MANZONI, 
THE COLUMN OF INFAMY 11 (Kenlem Foster & Jane Grigson trans. 1964) 
(1764). 
7 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 189 ((Oxford, Clarendon Press 1907) (1789)). 
8 See, e.g., C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT, A PHILOSOPHICAL 
INTRODUCTION 7-8 (1987).    
9 Mohamed M El Zeidy, The Gravity Threshold Under the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 19 CRIM. L.F. 35, 45 (2008) (El Zeidy criticizes 
the Pre-Trial Chamber for not focusing on the individual victims). 
10 DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE, THE ASYLUM AND 
ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA, 46-48 (2nd. ed. 2002).  
11 Or vice versa; because these goals are all different, there is no reason 
to assume that the same sentence would satisfy all different justifications.  
12 Ten, supra note 8, at 8. 
13 Bentham, supra note 7, at 170.  
14 Beccaria, supra note 6. 
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to be justified, it must have inherent value.15 According to 
Kantian deontology, because human beings have a free will and 
an inherent ability to will to do good, behavior that respects 
that free will have inherent value.16 The fundamental Kantian 
deontological claim, therefore, is that individuals ought to be 
treated as ends, worthy unto themselves, rather as means, or 
tools, used by others.17 Thus, for punishment to be justified, the 
act of punishment itself ought to have moral value, whether or 
not it produces beneficial results in the future. Retributivism is 
deontological because it considers punishment to be a good un-
to itself.18 According to retributivists, when a perpetrator chose 
to commit a crime, she made a conscious choice to break the 
law and must therefore be held responsible for her culpable ac-
tion.19 Without punishment there would be no manifestation to 
the criminal prohibition.20 
Deontological retributivists critique consequentialist justi-
fications for punishment by pointing out that consequentialists 
instrumentalize the perpetrators of crimes by using them as a 
means to achieve societal goals.21 Thus, a perpetrator sen-
tenced severely to deter others is not punished purely because 
of the wrongness of his actions, but is also made into an in-
strument by the state for the deterrence of others who may 
commit crimes in the future. Expressivists consider the pun-
ishment, and consequently the person being punished, as a tool 
for expressing societal norms.22 Deontologists consider the hu-
manity of the perpetrator, and his free will, to be the very rea-
son why he may be punished,23 and therefore consider ration-
ales that subject the free will to the good of others to be 
anathema to criminal punishment.24 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, IN 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL 
KANT 50 (Mary J. Gregor trans.) (2005) (1785). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 80. 
18 MARK TUNICK, HEGEL’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 35 (1992). 
19 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §100 (H.B. Nisbet trans., 2003) (1820). 
20 Id. §97 (German language in Brackets omitted). 
21 KANT, supra note 15, at 473. 
22 Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection 
at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 312 (2012). 
23 TUNICK, supra note 18, at 36. 
24 In Kant’s colorful language:  “Woe unto him who crawls through the 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/4
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The common thread to international crimes of the type ad-
judicated by the international criminal tribunals – namely gen-
ocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes – is the inhu-
mane treatment of the victims by the perpetrators. Whether 
the goals of the perpetrators are complete annihilation of a cul-
ture, or the physical abuse of innocents, the shared aspect of 
these crimes is the violation of the victims’ most basic rights 
and their treatment as means to an end. Punishing the perpe-
trators by treating them in the same manner therefore, as 
means to achieve social ends, is contradictory to the higher 
moral ground that criminal trials represent. The position ad-
hered to in this article will thus be that deontological retribu-
tion, rather than consequentialist justifications to punishment, 
should guide international criminal tribunals when they de-
termine the fate of the defendants they try.   
C. THE SEVERITY OF THE THREATS THAT CREATE DURESS AND 
THE SCOPE OF CRIMES THAT ARE COVERED BY THE DEFENSE 
Having briefly recounted the difference between the conse-
quentialist and deontological approaches to criminal law, we 
can formulate the defense of duress as a consequentialist or a 
deontologist would. And once we have formulated the defense 
according to each of these approaches, we will be able to exam-
ine the judges’ decisions and identify whether they are conse-
quentialist or a deontological. 
i. Statutory definitions of Duress 
William Blackstone defined duress as a type of compulsion 
caused by “threats and menaces, which induce a fear of death 
or other bodily harm, and which take away for that reason the 
guilt of many crimes and misdemeanors, at least before the 
human tribunal.”25 On one hand, at the core of this definition is 
the acknowledgment that some crimes are excusable when the 
defendant is subject to threats of death or bodily harm. On the 
other hand, Blackstone’s definition leaves many questions un-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
windings of eudaimonism in order to discover something that releases the 
criminal from punishment.” KANT, supra note 21, at 473. 
25 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV, 
2197 (William Jones ed., Bancroft-Whitney Company 1916) (1765-69). 
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answered, the most important of which is: “what is the ra-
tionale behind this defense?” Answering this question and un-
derstanding the rationale of the defense would enable one to 
answer the more practical questions courts have to contend 
with: the severity, immediacy, and credibility of the threats 
that create the defense – the “Severity of the Threats”; and the 
gravity of the crimes which duress can excuse – the “Scope of 
the Defense.”26 This is one of the elements that make duress a 
difficult defense to categorize. The other excuses apply not-
withstanding the gravity of the crimes that were committed. 
Insanity, for example, is always available as an excuse, no mat-
ter how grave the acts the defendant has been charged with.27 
The argument is made, however, that duress does not cover ex-
tremely grave crimes such as murder and genocide.28 
The criminal codes of various states provide varying mod-
els of the defense of duress, some providing better clues to the 
rationale for the defense than others. According to the French 
Code, “A person is not criminally liable who acted under the in-
fluence of a force or constraint which he could not resist.”29 
Constraint is interpreted to mean both physical and moral.30 
Thus ‘”moral compulsion” created by the threat to bodily integ-
rity is a complete defense.31 This definition focuses on the force 
constraining the defendant’s choice, rather than the harm that 
the defendant caused.32 In other words, the focus of the French 
definition of the defense is on the question of Severity of the 
Threats rather than of Scope of the Defense. The German Code 
states that  
“If someone commits a wrongful act in order to avoid an immi-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 17. The argument is made, however, that duress 
does not cover extremely grave crimes such as murder and genocide. See infra 
note 148 and accompanying text. 
27 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 17. 
28 See infra note 138. 
29 The language of the original French Criminal Code states : « N'est pas 
pénalement responsable la personne qui a agi sous l'empire d'une force ou 
d'une contrainte à laquelle elle n'a pu résister. » C. PÉN. 122-2. 
30 See FREDERIC DESPORTES & FRANCIS LE GUNEHEC, DROIT PENAL 
GENERAL ¶ 668 (10th ed. 2003). 
31 Id. 
32 See, e.g., KEVIN JON HELLER & MARKUS D. DUBBER, THE HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW, 227 (2011)(discussing constraint as the central 
feature of the defense in the French Code). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/4
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nent, otherwise unavoidable danger to life, limb, or liberty, either 
to himself or to a dependent or someone closely connected with 
him, the actor commits the act without culpability. This shall not 
apply if and to the extent that the offender could be expected un-
der the circumstances to accept the danger, in particular, because 
he himself had caused the danger, or was under a special legal 
obligation to do so…”33 
The German Code, unlike the French Code, does not di-
rectly mention the question of choice, rather, it focuses on the 
level of the harm that the perpetrator needs to be threatened 
with to justify the application of the defense, in other words, it 
focuses on the Scope of the Defense.   
The Rome Statute, however, seems to include both ele-
ments of choice and the element of harm. Article 31(1)(d) of the 
treaty states that  
“duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continu-
ing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or an-
other person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to 
avoid this threat, provided that the person does not intend to 
cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.”34  
None of these three, give a definite answer, however, as to 
what ought to guide the court when it determines the Severity 
of the Threats that trigger the defense and the Scope of the De-
fense.35 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Bundesgesetzblatt [STGB] [Criminal Code] §35 (Ger.), available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#StGB_000P35 
[hereinafter Bundesgesetzblatt]. 
34 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 31(1)(d), July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
35 The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code definition of duress 
does not provide an answer either.  
See MODEL PENAL CODE §2.09 (Proposed OFFICIAL DRAFT 1962):  
 (1) It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged 
to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a 
threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, that 
a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to 
resist. 
(2) The defense provided by this Section is unavailable if the actor reck-
lessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be 
subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was negligent in 
placing himself in such a situation, whenever negligence suffices to establish 
culpability for the offense charged. 
(3) It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her hus-
band, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense un-
9
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One crucial key to the question of Scope of the Defense and 
Severity of Threats is the determination whether duress is a 
justification or an excuse. If duress is viewed as a justification, 
a balance of evils analysis of sorts needs to be conducted in or-
der to identify the Severity of the Threats and the Scope of the 
Defense.36 As a justification, the Scope of the Defense will be 
directly tied to the Severity of the Threat. Because of this nex-
us between the two factors, if duress is applied as a justifica-
tion, its scope can be apriori capped because certain behaviors 
can be considered so wrongful that no matter how severe the 
harm these behaviors may prevent, they can never come within 
the Scope of the Defense.  However, if duress is an excuse, then 
the question of the Severity of the Threats would most probably 
take precedence over the question of the Scope of the Defense, 
inasmuch if the Severity of the Threat is dire enough, then all 
crimes would fit under the Scope of the Defense. To decide 
whether duress should be applied as a justification or an ex-
cuse, however, the differences between these two groups of de-
fenses should be more thoroughly explored. The subsections be-
low survey the different theories of excuse and duress from a 
deontological and from a consequentialist perspective.   
II. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXCUSES 
The difference between excuses and justifications is that 
excuses focus on the actor while justifications focus on the ac-
tor’s conduct.37 Exactly what this difference means is a matter 
for debate, and depends on the approach to criminal law (deon-
tological or consequentialist) adopted by the interpreter. When 
scholars state that justifications focus on the act, they mean 
that an act is excluded from criminal responsibility not because 
of some attribute of the actor, but rather because the act is 
generally justifiable and would always be so.38 Excuses, on the 
other hand, exclude criminal responsibility because some char-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
der this Section. [The presumption that a woman acting in the presence of 
her husband is coerced is abolished.] 
(4) When the conduct of the actor would otherwise be justifiable under 
Section 3.02, this Section does not preclude such defense. 
36 MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 42-3 (1997). 
37 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, 759 (1978). 
38 Id. at 760. 
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acteristic of the actor herself warrants refraining from holding 
her criminally responsible.39  
The sections below survey and critique theories of excuses 
and theories of justifications from consequentialist and retribu-
tive perspectives. Once the application of excuses and justifica-
tions has been explained, the next section provides the 
measures of the Severity of the Threats and Scope of the De-
fense of duress under each theory. Schematically, the four pos-
sibilities for application of duress would look like this: 
Table 1 
 Justification Excuse 
Consequentialist (i) Duress as a 
consequential  
justification 
(ii) Duress as a 
consequential ex-
cuse 
Deontologist (iii) Duress as a 
deontological  
justification 
(iv) Duress as a 
deontological ex-
cuse 
 
a. Theories of Excuses  
(i) Consequentialist Theory of Excuse  
Convincing consequentialist accounts of excuses are diffi-
cult to form, because consequentialism, as a paradigm, is less 
concerned with the guilt and agency of the individual, and 
more concerned with the aggregate benefits of his punish-
ment.40 Bentham justified excuses on the inefficacy of punish-
ing defendants who are not morally blameworthy.41 His claim 
was that in cases where, due to a flaw in the mental element, 
the defendant is not morally culpable, there is no sense in pun-
ishing the offender because this will not prevent him or others 
like him from committing the crime again.42 Because the of-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Id. 
40 David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Con-
temporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2013). 
41 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 173 (Oxford 1907) (1789). 
42 Id. 
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fender did not intend to commit the crime in the first place, she 
cannot be deterred from committing it again.43 Bentham fur-
ther developed this argument regarding insanity to state that 
because an insane individual, being irrational, cannot be de-
terred, punishing her is pointless.44 
Hart criticized this explanation by reminding us that per-
sonal deterrence is but one of the numerous utilities that con-
sequentialists derive from punishment. While personal deter-
rence might be ineffective when the mental state of the culprit 
is incompatible with the mental element required for the com-
mission of a criminal act, why punishing her would fail to deter 
others from committing the offense is unclear.45 Fletcher also 
criticizes Bentham’s assertion, arguing that deterrence is not 
aimed only at the specific members of society who are exactly 
similar to the culprit. That is, punishing for murder, if insanity 
is not an issue, is punishment for murder and would deter all 
would-be murders, not just insane ones.46 One could claim that 
for a true consequentialist, punishing a culprit who is only par-
tially guilty of the offense because of a potentially justifiable 
excuse would actually increase the deterrent effect on society 
by demonstrating the high likelihood of receiving punishment 
for the commission of the crime notwithstanding possible error.     
A shared and more nuanced approach to a consequentialist 
theory of excuses was presented in the late 1960’s by H.L.A. 
Hart and Richard Brandt. Brandt argued (and Hart made a 
similar argument)47 that a utilitarian rationale for excuses 
stems from the utility created by the general tendency of mem-
bers of society to adhere to and believe in the legal system.48 
Brandt’s began his argument by describing a legal (and moral) 
system as a structure that includes both prohibitions and ex-
ceptions to these prohibitions.49 Brandt further argued that ex-
cuses ought to embody the exceptions to the prohibitions that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, 19 (Oxford 1968). Hart 
famously called Bentham’s argument a “spectacular non sequitur.” 
46 FLETCHER, supra note 37, at 816. 
47 HART, supra note 45, at 39-40. 
48 Richard B. Brandt, A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses, 78 THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 3 337, 350 (1969). 
49 Id. at 347-348. 
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would weaken the adherence of members of the society to the 
legal structure, were they not provided, because they would 
make the prohibitions unjust.50 According to this explanation, 
if members of society will be punished for acts they did not in-
tend to commit, they will feel that they have been ill-treated, 
and be less likely to adhere to the law. In other words, point-
less punishment would create ill will towards the law and 
would therefore create disutility. 
The problem with Brandt’s theory is that it assumes away 
the moral ground on which it rests. Brandt’s utilitarianism 
states that punishment that is just is punishment that mini-
mizes the harms caused by crimes. Thus, a moral person, ac-
cording to Brandt, should support punishment that minimizes 
crimes. If this moral person is consistent, then he would not be 
put-off by purely consequentialist justifications for punishment 
and his sensibilities will not be injured if the punishments will 
indeed minimize crime. In other words, if the punishment is ef-
fective it is not unjust. If, as utilitarian consequentialists, we 
ought to believe that punishment that deters future crime is 
moral, then punishing culprits, whether they intended or not to 
commit the crime, is moral by the way of deterring potential 
evil-doers. Furthermore, if as Fletcher argues, punishing an 
individual who is not in control of his faculties is not pointless 
and may promote positive consequences, then the public would 
not be dissatisfied when such an individual would be punished 
because the punishment serves a utilitarian purpose. This 
means that Brandt’s underlying assumption, that punishing 
those who act without intent would create consternation, is un-
founded if the members of his society are the moral utilitarian 
agents that Brandt argues we ought to be. Inconsistencies not-
withstanding, Brandt and Hart’s explanations form a basis for 
consequentialist theory of excuse.  
(ii) Deontological Theory of Excuse 
Deontological accounts of excuses are easier to formulate 
than consequentialist accounts because the focal point of the 
theory is on the agency and free will of the defendant.51 Accord-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Id. at 353. 
51 Michael Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 21 ISRAEL L. REV. 
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ing to a deontological account, excuses are a set of conditions 
that make the actions of the individual inculpable because the 
actions were not the result of a choice to commit the actus re-
us.52 Automatism is a simple example of an excuse. When a 
person has no control over his bodily functions, she cannot be 
blamed for their consequences.53 Similarly, mistake of fact is 
considered an excuse, because the mistaken person did not 
have the capacity to make a choice not to commit the crime.54 
Immaturity, involuntary intoxication and insanity, likewise, 
excuse the offender because she is considered not to have the 
capacity to make choices that incur criminal responsibility.55  
Peter Westen mounts an interesting critique to this deon-
tological description of excuses. Westen argues that excuses 
should not be predicated on choice or capacity to choose,56 but 
rather on the attitude of the agent.57 The brunt of his criticism 
against choice theories is that when a person claims that he 
knew what he was doing was wrong, but was driven by an “un-
controllable urge,” the court has no way of giving the “uncon-
trollable urge” legal meaning.58  
Westen provides an example of cases in which an individu-
al who committed a criminal act knew that an act is wrong and 
yet committed the act nonetheless, later claiming that he was 
insane and lacked the ability to stop.59 Westen argues that the 
classic M’Naghten rule for determining insanity requires that 
the perpetrator not be aware of the wrongness of his actions.60 
Thus, a perpetrator who is aware of the wrongful nature of his 
deeds, but is unable to stop, cannot successfully argue insanity. 
Judges have, according to Westen, replaced the original re-
quirement of lack of awareness in the M’Naghten test with lack 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280, 284 (1989). 
52 FLETCHER, supra note 37, at 831. 
53 Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142, 145 (Wyo. 1981). 
54 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20(1)(a). 
55 Vera Bergelson, A Fair Punishment for Humbert Humbert: Strict Lia-
bility and Affirmative Defenses, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 55, 66-67 (2011). 
56 For brevity’s sake these will be called ‘choice theories’. 
57 Westen, supra note 3, at 353. 
58 Id. at 342. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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of control.61 Thus, the excuse of insanity is applied whether the 
perpetrator had awareness or not of the wrongful nature of her 
actions as long as she had no control. Westen contends that in 
situations of this sort, the act should be excused, but that 
choice theory cannot provide the justification because science, 
and jurists following science, are incapable of knowing when a 
person has or does not have control of his actions. Thus, be-
cause triers of fact are not capable of determining when some-
body who is capable of understanding his actions is incapable of 
controlling himself, the attempt to ground excuses on that in-
dividual’s ability to control is impractical.62  
According to Westen’s analysis, using lack of control as a 
legal benchmark may be both too inclusive and too exclusive. 
Choice theory might be too inclusive because it might allow 
someone like the protagonist of Poe’s Tell Tale Heart get away 
with his crime because he was obsessed with the murder, 
though he was in complete control of his faculties, and knew 
that he was in the wrong.63	  Choice theory might also be under 
inclusive because in a case like one described by Westen, where 
a defendant attacked and murdered helpless nuns when a voice 
in his head commanded him to do so, but stopped immediately 
when he was ordered by a police officer, it would be difficult to 
argue lack of control.64 Westen’s solution to this problem is an 
“attitudinal” approach to excuses. According to this approach, 
the core of criminal punishment is the condemnation of the 
culprit for his conduct.65 Thus, whenever the conduct is not 
such that society finds blameworthy, for example because it 
was not rationally perpetrated, it should be excused.66 Poe’s 
murderer knows what he is doing is wrong, he acts in a com-
pletely rational, albeit somewhat obsessed, manner and mur-
ders the old man. Bechard, the nun murderer, does not ration-
ally process his actions, but acts out of impulse, and is 
therefore not blameworthy. Westen’s reasoning is that because 
Bechard’s attitude does not deserve condemnation, because his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 342-43. 
63 EDGAR ALLAN POE, THE TELL TALE HEART AND OTHER WRITINGS 3 (Ban-
tam Classic ed. 1982) (1902). 
64 Westen, supra note 3, at 370. 
65 Id. at 357. 
66 Id. at 371. 
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conduct does not create indignation but pity, he should not be 
punished.67 According to this theory, Poe’s murderer should 
hang.  
The problem with Westen’s theory is that “blameworthi-
ness” ought not be treated as an abstract intuition. While de-
fining control and choice might be difficult, defining the “ra-
tionality” of the culprit is not easier. Westen’s attitudinal 
standard is no more definite than any other yardstick by which 
blameworthiness can be measured. Choice, the capacity to 
choose, and the capacity to control one’s actions are a better 
criterion than “rationality” because they focus on the element 
that makes the action culpable – the choice to violate the law.68 
While one might commit a crime with a “positive” attitude, mo-
tive, or rationale, the choice to commit the crime is at the es-
sence of the mental element of the crime (thus, for example, the 
law does not excuse political crimes even if they are motivated 
by some wish to do good).69 Hence, the lack of the mental ele-
ment, i.e. the lack of choice or the ability to make a choice (and 
lack of control means one cannot make a choice) best explains 
excuses.70  
Although it may be difficult to prove, whether an individu-
al chooses to violate the law or not is a factual question.71 On 
the other hand, determining whether an individual is rational 
or not is a value judgment rather than a factual judgment.72 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Id. at 371. 
68 See R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 154 
(1994). 
69 “[H]ardly any part of the penal law is more definitely settled than that 
motive is irrelevant;” JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 88 
(2nd ed. 2005) (1960). 
70 Applying choice theory to Bechard, a judge or jury, would have to hear 
his testimony, listen to expert opinion, and then decide if they are convinced 
whether he was in control of his faculties or acted in a world in which fact 
and fiction (the voices in his head ordering him to kill) were so intermixed 
that he was not capable of making a choice which would render him culpable. 
71 Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Decli-
nations, An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1439, 1458 (2004). 
72 See BARBARA TOWNSEND, REASON’S NEGLECT: RATIONALITY AND 
ORGANIZING, 3-6 (2008) (tracing the etymology of rationality and reasonable-
ness. Both culture and context specific terms that vary greatly depending on 
the eyes of the beholder); See generally Foucault’s critique in MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF 
REASON 77 (1988) (1965). 
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Thus, Westen’s critique fails to address a flaw in the recogni-
tion of choice as the determinant factor for the effect of the ex-
cuse, and to provide an alternative that enables a better de-
termination of the culpability of the individual asking to excuse 
her actions.  
b. Theories of Justifications  
(i) Consequentialist Theory of Justification  
Unlike excuses, justifications lend themselves to conse-
quentialist analysis. Westen and Mangiafico distinguish be-
tween justifications and excuses by claiming that justifications 
are a “choice of evil” type of defense.73 Eugene Milhizer de-
scribes the common thread of justification defenses as that of 
“superior interest” or “lesser harm.”74 Thus, justifications re-
quire some sort of balancing between competing interests. For 
consequentialists, this means calculating the harm caused by 
committing the crime and the harm caused by not committing 
the crime, and if the harm caused by committing the crime is 
the lesser harm, the action is justified.75 
 For consequentialists, therefore, the difference between 
excuses and justifications focuses purely on whether punishing 
the actor is non-beneficial (excuse) or whether punishing for 
the act is non-beneficial (justification). While both types of de-
fenses turn on maximizing utility, the focus on the agent as op-
posed to the action is what distinguishes between the two.  
(ii) Deontological Theory of Justifications  
A deontological theory of excuses focuses on the capacity of 
the defendant to make choices. A deontological theory of justifi-
cations, on the other hand, must appraise the choices the de-
fendant (who is deemed capable of making choices) made and 
determine whether these choices are justifiable.76 But while a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Westen and Mangiafico, supra note 4, at 934. 
74 Eugene R.  Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What 
They Are, and What They Ought to Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 844 (2004). 
75 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defense: A Systematic Analysis, 82 
COLUMBIA L. REV. 199, 213 (1982). 
76 Ken Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 
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consequentialist theory of justifications will determine the jus-
tifiability of an act based on its consequences, because deonto-
logical ethics value actions based on their own merit,77 a deon-
tological theory of justifications cannot be based on the good 
consequences of the choice to violate the law. Thus, a deonto-
logical theory of justifications must show why a moral duty ex-
ists to act in a certain way even though the action violates a 
criminal prohibition.78  
Because justifying a criminal act means preferring not to 
act upon one ground for a duty (to obey the law) in order to act 
upon another ground for duty (the justified action), a deontolog-
ical theory of justifications must contend with the dilemma of 
conflicting grounds for duties. A hypothetical will be useful to 
demonstrate the problem and the solution: In a two-apartment 
building, a person is trapped in one of the apartments (apart-
ment 1) and his life is at immediate risk. Because of the con-
struction of the house, this person can only be reached by 
breaking into the second apartment in the building (apartment 
2). Because of the immediacy of the situation, the owner of 
apartment 2 cannot be reached in time to save the trapped in-
dividual.  
At first blush, one might believe that adherence to a deon-
tological categorical imperative would doom the trapped man. 
Clearly, breaking into private property is not a rule that ought 
to be universalized.79 Because to Kantian deontology “an action 
from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained 
by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided 
upon,”80 a first impression would lead one to believe that break-
ing into an apartment in order to accomplish something else 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1899-1900 (1984). 
77 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, IN 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL 
KANT) (Mary J. Gregor trans.) (2005) (1785) 50. 
78 As demonstrated below, this statement is the fusion of a deontological 
method for resolving conflict of interests, and its application to the situations 
which justifications are applied to such as necessity, justification, and self-
defense.   
79 To summarize very briefly, because the idea of private property is such 
that one cannot enter another’s property without permission, it is a logical 
fallacy to make a universal rule by which it is permissible to enter another’s 
property without permission.   
80 KANT, supra note 15, at 55 [Kant 4:400]. 
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(saving a life for example) is unjustified. The mere fact that the 
benefits of saving a life exceed the costs of breaking into an 
apartment cannot be a justification for action according to de-
ontological ethics. But not breaking into the apartment also 
constitutes a breach of an obligation – namely the obligation 
not to stand by and watch another person die.81  
In this hypothetical therefore, one might surmise that 
there is a duty both to act and not to act. Naturally, a moral 
theory that would consider both of these courses of actions “du-
ties,” in the sense that a moral agent is obliged to act according 
to both, would be impracticable because it would tell us nothing 
about how to solve moral dilemmas. It is not impracticable, 
however, to consider both of these courses of actions as grounds 
for duties rather than complete duties.82 The difference is cru-
cial. When we use the term “duty” we refer to something that 
must be acted upon.83 When we refer to “ground for duty,” we 
refer to something that creates an obligation, but only insofar 
as it can be acted upon.84 In other words, if a duty cannot be 
acted upon, it cannot possibly be the case that it must be acted 
upon. This does not mean that there is not a good reason 
(grounds for duty/obligation) for a person to act upon these 
grounds, but because acting upon them is impossible, there 
cannot possibly be a duty to do so.  
A second hypothetical will be useful to demonstrate this 
point before returning to the two-apartment building. Consider 
person X, who cannot swim, is stranded on a sand bar after the 
tide came in. Consider further person that Y, who cannot swim, 
is looking on from the shore at person X. Y certainly has 
grounds for a duty to do save X, but she cannot. The grounds 
for Y’s duty to save X are the requirement not to stand by while 
another is in trouble, but because Y cannot save X, to say that 
Y has a duty, in the sense that the duty necessitates action, 
would be an empty statement. In other words, there are situa-
tions when a general duty exists, but when that duty does not 
necessitate action because taking that action is not possible. Y 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 KANT, supra note 21, at 572 [Kant 6:453]. 
82 Id.  at 388-390 [Kant 6:232-233]. 
83 Onora Nell, Acting on Principle, an Essay on Kantian Ethics, 132-33 
(1975). 
84 BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT, 218 (1993). 
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ought to will to help X, but because she cannot do so, she has 
no duty to attempt the impossible.85 Were a boat to float down 
the current enabling Y to reach X and save his life, the duty 
would become actionable and Y would not only have grounds 
for a duty to save X, but would be duty bound to do so.  
In the hypothetical of the apartment building, there are 
two separate grounds for duties involved. There are grounds for 
a duty not to enter apartment 2 without permission. There are 
also grounds for the duty to save the life of the person in the 
apartment 1. As Kant posits, an agent in this situation might 
have two grounds of duties, but if these grounds conflict so that 
he can only act on one ground, then the other does not necessi-
tate action and does not create a duty.86 This treatment of con-
flicting grounds of duties, which recognizes that obligations we 
cannot act upon do not create absolute duties, is the key to ex-
pounding a deontological theory of justifications. In the apart-
ment building scenario, the decision to act is not difficult to 
make. The values underlying protection of property are not as 
inimical to the preservation of agency and free-will as the val-
ues underlying the protection of life. Thus, while one ought not 
to break into apartment 2, doing so is justified because of the 
duty to save the life of the person in apartment 1.  
Obeying the law out of duty rather than inclination is the 
basis of Kantian philosophy.87 Respecting the criminal prohibi-
tions is part and parcel of this duty. Therefore, for any member 
of society, grounds for a duty not to act in violation of criminal 
law always exist. However, in a given situation, other grounds 
for duty might also exist. Following a weighing of these 
grounds for duties, an agent may determine that the grounds 
for a given duty are stronger than the grounds for the duty to 
obey the law. The important difference between a deontological 
theory of justifications and a consequentialist theory of justifi-
cations is that deontologists weigh the grounds for the duty to 
act, not the results of each action.  
When societies enact justificatory defenses into the crimi-
nal codes, they effectively spell out a limited number of 
grounds for duties that create a stronger obligation than the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Id. 164. 
86 KANT, supra 82, at 378-379 [Kant 6:224]. 
87 KANT, supra 80, at 50 [Kant 4:294]. 
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obligation to obey a criminal prohibition.88 How societies make 
the determination which grounds for duty create a stronger ob-
ligation than obeying the law is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle,89 but understanding that justifications make this determi-
nation, aids us to correctly asses the meaning of justificatory 
defenses.  
The justification of obedience to military orders, as it is set 
out by numerous criminal codes, presents a convenient exam-
ple. Article 122-7 of the French Criminal Code States “A person 
is not criminally liable who performs an action commanded by 
a lawful authority, unless the action is manifestly unlawful.”90 
Similarly, the general part of the Israeli criminal code states 
that “a person shall not be criminally liable for conduct com-
mitted… according to an order handed down by an authority 
that he is obliged to obey according to the law, unless the order 
is manifestly unlawful.”91 Using the deontological rationale for 
justifications, we can surmise that the Israeli and French legis-
lators considered that soldiers’ obedience to superior commands 
(an authority that a soldier is obliged to obey according to the 
law) is a stronger ground of duty than the ground of the duty to 
refrain from violating the law. Thus, a soldier who obeys an or-
der by her superior officer is excluded from criminal liability. 
The legislators, however, did not believe that the grounds of 
the duty to obey orders are always the strongest grounds for 
action, and therefore conditioned this justification by stipulat-
ing that when an order is manifestly illegal, it no longer creates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Thus, for example, the defense of justification permits agents of the 
state to encroach upon the ground for a duty not to use physical force against 
their fellow beings when they act upon the stronger ground for duty to main-
tain public safety. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10(2) (McKinney). 
89 Thus, different jurisdictions will include different justifications in their 
penal systems. For example, in Florida the right to use deadly force against a 
perceived assault, even when retreat is possible, is considered a stronger 
ground for a duty to act than the grounds for a duty to refrain from taking 
another’s life; FLA. STAT. ANN. §776.032(1) (West). In New York, on the other 
hand, the duty to refrain from taking another’s life is considered stronger; 
N.Y. Penal Law §31.15(2)(a) (McKinney). 
90 “N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui accomplit un acte 
commandé par l'autorité légitime, sauf si cet acte est manifestement illégal;” 
C. PEN. 122-4 (Fr). 
91 Criminal Law (General Part), 5754 1993-94, SH No. 357, § 34(13). In 
the original: “  םדא אשיי אל השעמל תילילפ תוירחאב ... היהש תכמסומ תושר לש וצ יפ לע
הל תייצל ןיד יפל בייח ,ןידכ אלש לילעב אוה וצה םא תלוז . “ The translation is mine. 
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grounds of duty to obey, and that the ground of the duty to re-
frain from violating the law prevail when the violation is mani-
fest. Notably, the result is not the guiding principle, but rather 
the duties to obey the law and to obey commands.  
A deontological adjudicator who needs to make a decision 
on any justification defense therefore, will examine the grounds 
of the duty that the justification raises above the grounds of the 
duty to obey the law. If the adjudicator finds that the grounds 
of the duty that the justification protects exist, then that adju-
dicator will find that there is no criminal responsibility.  
D. DESCRIPTIONS OF DURESS  
Having described the difference between justifications and 
excuses according to the different criminal law paradigms (con-
sequentialist and deontological), we can now proceed to see how 
duress is defined under the different theories of justification 
and excuse. This determination is important because substan-
tive differences are found between the different applications of 
duress according to the different theories of excuse and justifi-
cations. This determination will therefore enable us to estab-
lish which theory of punishment the tribunal has adopted in a 
given case. Judges usually apply legal doctrines to the specific 
cases without declaring that they are doing so in accordance 
with a given criminal law paradigm or another.92 Demonstrat-
ing the different manners in which duress can be applied as a 
justification or an excuse under the two paradigms of criminal 
law will provide us with four arch-types of the duress defense. 
By examining tribunal decisions and determining which of the 
four arch-types the tribunal used, we are able to state which 
criminal law paradigm is used by the judges.93  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 659 F.3d 1252, 1259 n.1 (9th Cir. 
2011) (rejecting the prosecution’s attempt to apply duress as a consequential-
ist justification without using the terms “excuse,” “justification,” “deontologi-
cal,” or “consequentialist.”).	   
93 Thus, if a tribunal applies duress in a manner similar to the conse-
quentialist justification arch-type, we will be able to determine that, at least 
regarding duress, the tribunal is thinking about criminal law in a consequen-
tialist manner. 
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i. Duress from a Consequentialist Perspective  
a. Duress as a Consequentialist Justification 
A consequentialist applying duress as a justification (ru-
bric (i) in Table 1) would ask if the damage caused by the per-
son under duress is greater than the damage he would have in-
curred had he not acted (i.e. if his action is beneficial or 
harmful and should therefore be encouraged as justified or dis-
couraged as unjustified and therefore criminal).  Thus, if a tri-
bunal: (1) determines the costs and benefits of the defendant’s 
criminal act (i.e. the cost of the damage created by the commis-
sion of the crime against the benefit of the harm that was 
averted). Then, (2) the tribunal decides, based upon step (1), 
whether it wants to promote the defendant’s behavior in socie-
ty. And finally, (3) the tribunal decides whether to punish, and 
how severely, in a manner that will best induce the behavior it 
saw fit based on steps (1) and (2). Then, we can surmise that 
the tribunal is applying duress as a justification and acting un-
der a consequentialist paradigm.  
The Severity of the Threats and the Scope of the Defense 
when duress is applied as a consequentialist justification are 
codependent. The more severe the threats the perpetrator is 
faced with, the broader the scope of the crimes that can be 
committed to avoid those threats.94 However, some crimes may 
be considered so costly that they may be outside the Scope of 
the Defense, even if the risk to the perpetrator is death.95  
b. Duress as a Consequentialist Excuse  
A consequentialist applying duress as an excuse (square 
(ii) in Table 1) asks if punishing the individual under duress is 
likely to deter him or others like him in the future. For exam-
ple, a consequentialist asks if punishing people in similar situ-
ations is likely to increase or decrease the likelihood of others 
committing the crime, or if it is likely to deter others in a dif-
ferent situation from trying to exploit the defense. Thus if, in a 
given case, the tribunal asks whether the punishment is likely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse 
and Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1350-51 (1989). 
95 Id. at 1352.  
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to cause the offender, or a similarly situated offender, not to 
commit the crime in the future, it can be surmised that the tri-
bunal considers duress an excuse, and that as an excuse, it is 
judged in a consequentialist manner. Similarly to the conse-
quentialist excuse, the Severity of the Threats and the Scope of 
the Defense would be codependent.   
ii. Duress from a Deontological Perspective  
a. Duress as a Deontological Justification 
A deontologist applying duress as a justification needs to 
assume that the grounds of the duty of self-preservation are 
superior to the grounds of the duty to obey the law. As noted 
above, a criminal act can be a justification from a deontological 
perspective when the grounds for an obligation acted upon by 
committing a crime creates a stronger obligation to act than 
the obligation not to commit the crime. To conceive duress as a 
deontological justification means that the grounds for the duty 
to prevent harm to ourselves is stronger, and therefore over-
rides the grounds of the duty to prevent harm to others.  
Formulated as a maxim for action, the individual applying 
duress as deontological justification says: “Because of a threat 
of bodily harm to me, I will violate the law, even to the degree 
of causing another person bodily harm, because the prohibition 
against causing another bodily harm is weaker grounds for act-
ing on a duty than the prohibition against causing harm to 
me.”96 The problem with this maxim is that it makes self-
preservation a higher ground of action than preservation of the 
other. In other words, it justifies using another person as a 
means to the end of one’s self-preservation. While deontological 
thought, at least as formulated by Kant, does not require altru-
ism, it does not permit an actor to use another merely for her 
own benefits.97 Deontological thinking requires that all actions 
be of a kind that can be universalized; ordering obligations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 The method by which one ought to determine which elements of the 
contemplated action ought to be part of the formulation of the maxim (also 
known as the action description problem) is beyond the scope of this article; 
see G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 37-47 (1958); ERIC D’ARCY, HUMAN ACTS AN 
ESSAY IN THEIR MORAL EVALUATION 21 (1963); HERMAN, supra note 83, at 150. 
97 KANT, supra note 15, at 79. 
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should be applicable to all situations and based on the obliga-
tion itself, not on the actor who has that obligation.98 However, 
ordering self-preservation above the preservation of the other 
cannot be universalized, as no rational individual would apriori 
wish to live in a society in which her wellbeing is secondary to 
that of her peers.  
Because mere self-preference cannot be the ground which 
makes the duty to violate the law stronger than the duty to 
obey the law, the maxim formulated above must be reformulat-
ed without that element. In other words, treating duress as a 
justification under the deontological paradigm would require 
removing the element of duress that refers to violating the law, 
in order to specifically protect oneself from harm. The maxim 
for duress would then be: “When something is threatened with 
harm, I will violate the law, even to the degree of causing a dif-
ferent harm, when the prohibition against causing the second 
harm is weaker grounds for acting on a duty than the prohibi-
tion against causing the first harm.” This iteration of duress, 
however, is exactly what necessity is – namely – the justifica-
tion of a criminal act if it has prevented a greater harm.99 
Adopting this maxim makes the defense of duress redundant. 
In other words, duress cannot be formulated coherently as a 
deontological justification. 
b. Duress as a Deontological Excuse 
Arguing duress as an excuse under the deontological para-
digm of criminal law (square (iv) in Table 1) means proposing 
that, because of the pressure placed on a defendant, she is not 
capable of expressing her will by making a choice to obey the 
law and is therefore excused from criminal liability.100 The 
most important difference between this description of duress 
and the justification description of duress is that this descrip-
tion does not legitimate the action. Thus, were a tribunal to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Id. at 73. 
99 See Kai Ambos, Other Grounds for Excusing Criminal Responsibility, 
in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1003, 1016 (An-
tonio Cassese et al., eds., 2002), available at http://www.department-
ambos.unigoettingen.de/index.php/component/option,com_docman/Itemid, 
133/gid,131/task,cat_view/. 
100 FLETCHER, supra note 37, at 829. 
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apply duress as a deontological excuse, this would not mean 
that the criminal action was legitimate, but rather that in the 
specific instance it was perpetrated, because of the circum-
stances under which the perpetrator was directly acting, she 
had no choice. Kant provides an example that distinguishes be-
tween the two. He argues that a man floating on a plank in the 
ocean cannot be tried for pushing off somebody else who tries to 
get on the plank.101 This, according to Kant, is not because the 
action is not culpable, but because it is unpunishable due to 
lack of choice.102 The Scope of the Defense, in this instant, 
would be infinite, so long as the Severity of the Threats is suffi-
cient. In other words, the defense of duress takes on a binary 
nature as a deontological excuse. Either sufficient duress ex-
ists, and then choice is removed and all crimes are excused, or 
insufficient duress is applied, and then no excuse exists at all.  
Applying duress as an excuse, however, is not without 
complications. The heftiest criticism against the application of 
duress as a deontological excuse is correctly aimed by scholars 
at what is essentially a fiction regarding the lack of choice by a 
person acting under duress.103 Unlike the involuntary response 
of a person acting under automatism, and distinct from mis-
take of facts or insanity, an agent acting under duress under-
stands the wrongful implications of her actions and yet pro-
ceeds with her conduct.104 The very choice to act upon the 
threat, and therefore to refrain from harming oneself, suggests 
reflection and choice.  
Indeed, although cases in which duress was taken serious-
ly by courts are rare, extant examples demonstrate a measure 
of reflection by the culprits. The sailors in the famous Regina v. 
Dudley and Stephens105 case deliberated between themselves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 KANT, supra note 15, at 392. 
102 Id. 
103 See, e.g., Claire O. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the 
Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 270 (1995); see also Westen, supra note 
4, at 902. 
104 Id. 
105 R v. Dudley and Stephens, [1884] Q.B. 273 (Eng.). That case was ar-
gued on necessity rather than duress, but adopting the distinction between 
duress and necessity described above, the choice of the defendant’s was simi-
lar to a decision that would have been made under duress; see GEORGE 
FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 132 (1998). 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/4
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before eating their crewmate.106 In another case, where sailors 
in a longboat threw passengers overboard lest the boat capsize, 
the court also suggests that the actions of the sailors on the 
longboat were not instinctual.107 From the moment the sailors 
got into the longboat, they knew they might have to throw 
some of the survivors overboard, though their captain on an-
other life boat preferred they not discuss this in the begin-
ning.108 Their choice to throw overboard only men whose wives 
were not also on the vessel shows further deliberation.109 Simi-
larly, in the ICTY case discussed at length below, the perpetra-
tor, Drazen Erdemović, clearly knew his actions were wrong, 
asked to be dismissed and only upon the threat of death partic-
ipated in the killing because of his concern for his wife and 
child.110 
The answer to this potent criticism, that individuals under 
duress are not incapable of making choices, is that choices, to 
be morally significant, ought to be free. If the entire point of 
punishment is to cause responsible actors deserved pain in ret-
ribution for their choices, these choices must be made with free 
will. Claiming that the will of an agent under duress is free and 
that such agent can freely choose to die rather than commit the 
crime is possible of course. But this would be asking too 
much.111 There is something about self-preservation, about ex-
tinguishing the very ability to make choices should the duress 
be ignored, that makes free choice an unacceptable term for the 
situation of a person under mortal threat. Societies give medals 
to individuals who risk their lives for the sake of others.112 The-
se individuals are hailed as heroes, exceptional beings whose 
actions are worthy of praise and are made into Homeric myths 
and Hollywood movies; surely demanding all people in society 
to be heroic is contrary to the idea of heroism so deeply in-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW: A 
VICTORIAN YACHTING TRAGEDY 60-61 (1984). 
107 United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (also ar-
gued as a necessity defense). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, ¶14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
For the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996). 
111 SANFORD KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT 144 (1987). 
112 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 3741. 
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grained in societies all over the world. In other words, the law 
considers the free choice to die or to suffer severe bodily harm, 
to be no choice at all. It thereby recognizes that not all men and 
women are heroes, and excuses those who are not heroes from 
criminal guilt when they act human.113 
Having differentiated the different manners in which du-
ress will be applied, depending on the way it is conceived by the 
judges (as a justification or excuse) and depending on the judg-
es’ approach to criminal law (consequentialist or deontologist), 
we can now see how the judges at the international criminal 
tribunals applied the defense, and then look back and catego-
rize their decisions. 
E. DURESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
The definition and application of the defense of duress by 
international criminal tribunals can be divided into two peri-
ods: Duress as it was applied by the International Military Tri-
bunals (NMTs) following the Second World War, and duress as 
it was applied by the ICTY. As demonstrated below, in the 
NMTs duress was understood to be a deontological excuse. The 
situation at the ICTY is more complex. 
i. The International Military Tribunals 
The Nürnberg Military Tribunals applied duress as a de-
ontological excuse in a number of the major trials. In the 
Krupp case, the tribunal tried the exploitation of slaves by the 
Krupp industrial conglomerate during the Second World 
War.114 In Krupp, the judges emphasized that criminal respon-
sibility does not exist without will and intent.115 In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Some sources, most notably the German Criminal Code, make an ex-
ception to the free choice theory of excuse by limiting it to professionals who 
take risk upon themselves; see Bundesgesetzblatt, supra note 32. This excep-
tion is only convincing if one thinks that men and women can contract away 
their right to self-preservation. There is a distinct difference between accept-
ing great risk to one’s life (like a soldier in a charge for example) and between 
positively agreeing to die (like a soldier jumping on a live grenade). Soldiers 
are expected to do the former, and are immortalized when they do the latter. 
114 Krupp Case, United States of America against Alfried Felix Alwyn 
Krupp Von Bohlen und Halbach, Tribunal III, Case No. 10, VOL. X, TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NÜRNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, 1 (1949). 
115 Id. at 1439. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/4
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Einsatzgruppen case, the tribunal tried commanders and sol-
diers who were members of the mobile killing units employed 
by the German army after it had invaded Eastern Europe in 
1941.116 Referring to the defense of duress, the judges stated: 
…that there is no law which requires that an innocent man must 
forfeit his life or suffer serious harm in order to avoid committing 
a crime which he condemns. The threat, however, must be immi-
nent, real, and inevitable. No court will punish a man who, with 
a loaded pistol at his head, is compelled to pull lethal lever.117  
In both cases, the duress defense was determined inadmis-
sible because the defendants did not prove that they would 
have been harmed if they did not obey,118 and because the pros-
ecution showed that the defendants were willingly and enthu-
siastically collaborating with their superiors.119 In the decision 
regarding the major war criminals, the International Military 
Tribunal for the Major War Criminals ruled out the defense of 
superior orders elaborating that responsibility is grounded in 
the possibility of making a moral choice.120 
These cases show that the Nürnberg tribunals were willing 
to consider applying duress to the field commanders and sol-
diers who perpetrated genocide (the Einsatzgruppen case), and 
to financiers who knowingly exploited the labor of slaves, they 
knew were worked to death, for financial gain. This willingness 
to consider applying the defense shows that the Scope of the 
Defense was not a central issue in considering whether the de-
fense applied. On the other hand, the tribunal’s statement that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Einsatzgruppen Case, United States of American against Otto Ohlen-
dorf, Tribunal II, Case No. 9, VOL. IV, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NÜRNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, 3 (1949). 
117 Id. at 480. 
118 Krupp Case, supra note 113, at 1444-45; Einsatzgruppen Case, supra 
note 115, at 482-83. 
119 Id. In the Flick case, on the other hand, a few of the defendants suc-
ceeded in convincing the tribunal that they were in severe and imminent 
danger and were consequently found not criminally responsible for their ac-
tions. See Flick Case, United States of American against Friedrich Flick, Tri-
bunal IV, Case No. 5, VOL. VI, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NÜRNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, 1201-2 (1949). Friedrich Flick, like Krupp, 
headed an industrial complex that utilized slave labor for profit during the 
war. 
120Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law--
International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg), Judgment and Sentences,	  41 
AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 221 (1947). 
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“a man, with a loaded pistol at his head, is compelled”,121 
demonstrates that the tribunals considered the Severity of the 
Threats to directly affect the ability of the perpetrator to exer-
cise free choice and to decide whether to commit the crime. The 
focus on the Severity of the Threats and the recognition of its 
existence to serve as a complete defense, demonstrates that the 
judges applied duress as a deontological excuse. 
 ii. The Erdemović Trial 
a. Background and Trial Chamber I decision 
Drazen Erdemović was born in Titoist Yugoslavia to a Cro-
atian family in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he conducted his 
mandatory military service with the Yugoslavian National Ar-
my until March 1992.122 According to his testimony before the 
ICTY Trial Chamber, following the breakup of the Republic of 
Yugoslavia, from May until November he served in the Army of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina but left it because he did not wish to 
participate in the war.123 He was then mobilized into the Croa-
tian Defence Council where he served until November of 
1993.124 In April of 1994, after five months of unemployment, 
he voluntarily joined a unit of mixed ethnicities in the Bosnian 
Serb army. His role in that capacity, according to his testimo-
ny, was to reconnoiter enemy positions and sabotage artillery 
equipment.125  
On July 16th, 1995, however, that role changed radically 
when he was ordered, along with a number of men from his 
unit, to report to the site of a farm in Pilica for an undisclosed 
mission.126 Upon arrival at the farm, he and his colleagues 
were ordered to execute civilian men between the ages of sev-
enteen and sixty, who were brought to the farm by buses.127 
When Erdemović told his direct superior he would not partici-
pate in the murder, his commander gave him the option of join-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Einsatzgruppen Case, supra note 116, at 480 (emphasis added). 
122 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, ¶79 (Nov. 29, 1996). 
123 Id. at ¶ 79. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at ¶ 80. 
127 Id. at ¶ 2. 
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ing the men about to be killed.128 Erdemović participated in the 
killing of approximately 1,200 innocent men and boys that af-
ternoon.129 Following this initial event, he was again ordered to 
participate in the murder of another 500 civilians.130 This time 
he refused, along with three other soldiers, and did not partici-
pate.131 A few days later, a member of his unit shot Erdemović 
for not participating in the second killing, causing him serious 
injury.132 Though this was not an officially sanctioned punish-
ment, Erdemović testified that he suspected he was shot on the 
orders of a superior officer.133 Shortly after being released from 
the hospital, Erdemović confided a journalist about what he 
had witnessed. He was then arrested and sent to the Hague to 
stand trial.134  
At the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, Erdemović plead guilty, 
but at the same time explained that he had committed the 
crime under duress.135 It is very likely that Erdemović’s law-
yers expected the court to further investigate the duress argu-
ment, relying on the civil law trial procedure, according to 
which the judges will not be satisfied with the defendant’s 
submissions, but will investigate further themselves.136 The 
Trial Chamber, however, operating as a common law court does 
when presented with a guilty plea, rendered its sentencing de-
cision based on the evidence before it, and ruled it had not been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Id. at ¶ 80. According to Erdemović’s testimony, the threat carried 
weight because a man had already been executed by this commander for in-
subordination before. 
129 Id. at ¶ 85. 
130 Id. at ¶ 81. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at ¶ 10. The ICTY Trial Chamber did not address this discrepancy 
in Erdemović’s plea, who essentially argued both guilt and an affirmative de-
fense. The Trial Chamber’s omission eventually led the Appeals Chamber to 
return the case to the Trial Chamber. At least one other guilty plea before an 
international tribunal, was then followed by a statement, during the sentenc-
ing hearing, that duress was applied to the accused. See Prosecutor v. Joao 
Franca da Silva Alias Jhoni Franca, Dili District Court, Special Panel for Se-
rious Crimes, Case No. 04a/2001, Judgment (5/12/2002). Other than quoting 
the defendant’s proclamation, the Panel did not investigate this claim and 
because no appeal was brought the defendant’s claim was not ruled upon. 
136 Maximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International 
Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 865 (2005). 
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presented with sufficient evidence that Erdemović was indeed 
acting under duress.137 Erdemović was found guilty of the 
crime of humanity of murder.138 He then appealed the Trial 
Chamber’s decision.  
b. The Appeals Chamber 
The Appeals Chamber’s decision focused on two issues: (i) 
whether Erdemović’s actions should be excused because he was 
under duress, and (ii) whether the Trial Chamber should have 
accepted his guilty plea.139 Because of the two distinct ques-
tions, and because of the divergent views of the judges, the tri-
bunal’s judgment was divided into four separate opinions. 
Judge Li wrote a separate opinion in which he ruled (i) that the 
guilty plea was properly made, and (ii) that the defense of du-
ress cannot afford Erdemović an excuse because of the crimes 
he committed.140 Judges McDonald and Vohrah wrote a joint 
separate opinion in which (i) they ruled that Erdemović’s guilty 
plea was not properly made and that the case should therefore 
be remanded to the Trial Chamber, and (ii) ruled that duress 
cannot excuse the crimes perpetrated by Erdemović.141 Judges 
Stephen and Cassese each wrote a separate opinion in which 
they ruled (i) that the guilty plea was equivocal and that the 
case should be remanded to the Trial Chamber and (ii) that the 
defense of duress, if its elements can be proved by Erdemović in 
the Trial Chamber, can excuse him from criminal liability.142 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Erdemović, supra note 122, at ¶20. 
138 Id. at ¶¶ 20, 25. 
139 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment on Appeal, ¶ 
16 (Oct. 7, 1997)). Because of the multiplicity of the opinions, the tribunal 
published five different documents that constitute the Appeals Chamber de-
cision. The Judgment provides the background and the disposition of the case 
and four separate opinions of the judges provide the ruling of each judge on 
the two issues that were discussed by the Appeals Chamber. 
140 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, ¶ 27, Separate and 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li (Oct. 7, 1997) available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-asojli971007e.pdf.   
141 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, ¶¶ 89-91, Joint Sepa-
rate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah (Oct. 7, 1997) available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-asojmcd971007e.pdf. 
142 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissent-
ing Opinion of Judge Stephen, ¶¶ 68-69 (Oct. 7, 1997) Prosecutor v. Erde-
mović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Cassese, ¶ 50 (Oct. 7, 1997) available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/4
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Thus, the court unanimously ruled that Erdemović should not 
be acquitted;143 ruled by a majority of four against one that the 
appeal was improperly made;144 and ruled by a majority of 
three to two that duress cannot excuse Erdemović’s responsibil-
ity even if all the facts claimed by him were proved to be 
true.145 
The analysis that follows will focus only on the question of 
the applicability of duress to Erdemović’s case. Thus, the Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah and the 
Separate Opinion of Judge Li, will be examined together, while 
the Separate Opinions of Judge Stephen and of Judge Cassese 
will each be examined separately as they apply different rea-
soning to arrive at their respective conclusions.  
(1) The Majority Opinion on Duress: Judges McDonald and 
Vohrah and Judge Li 
The majority judges on the question of duress, Judges 
McDonald, Vohrah, and Li, analyzed post-Second World War 
international tribunals and various current jurisdictions, and 
came to the conclusion that though duress is generally recog-
nized as a defense, there is no consensus as to whether there is 
a consensus as to exceptions to its application.146 Judges 
McDonald and Vohrah examined the common law stance 
against the applicability of duress as a defense to murder,147 
and came to the conclusion that this exception to the defense is 
the result of a cultural moral absolute on the subject of murder 
that has developed in the English courts,148 and does not reflect 
common state practice.149 They therefore turned to policy ra-
ther than state practice to justify their decision.150 
Judges McDonald, Vohrah, and Li posed the question: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-adojcas971007e.pdf. 
143 Erdemović Appeals Judgment, supra note 139, at 17. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 
141, at ¶¶ 58-65. 
147 See, e.g., United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 206 (9th Cir. 1991). 
148 Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 
138, at ¶ 71. 
149 Id. at ¶ 72. 
150 Id. at ¶ 75. 
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“what ruling on the scope of duress is likely to bring about the 
least number of deaths?”151 Determining that the defense of du-
ress can be too easily exploited, the majority judges ruled that, 
from a policy perspective,152 duress should not be a complete 
defense to the murder of innocents.153 Judges McDonald and 
Vohrah also criticized, as overly utilitarian, the analysis of 
Judges Stephen and Cassese, who ruled (each for a different 
reason) that because Erdemović would have died had he re-
fused to participate in the murder, but would not have stopped 
the murder, he should not be convicted.154 
As will shortly be demonstrated below, Judges McDonald 
and Vohrah erred in their description of Judge Stephen’s and 
Judge Cassese’s opinion, neither of which is utilitarian.155 This 
error is somewhat ironic, considering the very utilitarian na-
ture of their decision. The majority decision essentially decides 
whether the defendant before the tribunal is guilty, not based 
on whether he was personally responsible for his actions, but 
rather based on whether recognition of his lack of culpability 
might be exploited by other wrongdoers. As Aaron Fichtleberg 
put it, “the reasons put forward by the court to justify the deni-
al of duress as a complete defense were… matters of policy, not 
principle – concerns wholly foreign to a legal regime such as in-
ternational criminal law.”156 
In utilitarian terms, the majority’s opinion can be ex-
plained thus: the harm caused by punishing the defendant, 
even if he had no choice but to participate in the murder, is 
lesser than the harm that will be caused by others who will be 
able to exploit this defense (if it is recognized) and therefore 
policy requires that we find him guilty. The majority’s decision 
is consequentialist in subjecting the basic notions of guilt and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Id. at ¶¶ 77-78. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at ¶¶ 79-80. 
155 Had Cassese’s and Stephan’s conclusions been based on the useless-
ness of Erdemović’s death had he refused, thereby “increasing” the disutility, 
the majority judges would have been correct. That is not the rationale of ei-
ther of the minority judges’ separate opinions. 
156 Aaron Fichtelberg, Liberal Values in International Criminal Law: A 
Critique of Erdemovic, 6 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3, 14 
(2008). 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/4
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responsibility to the consequences of the decision, making the 
concepts of innocence or culpability dependent on the manner 
their application will increase or decrease future crime. Both 
Judges McDonald and Vohrah and Judge Li claimed that their 
determination of the Scope of the Defense is the only sound 
manner of interpreting what duress ought to be in light of the 
purposes of international humanitarian law – the mitigation of 
harm to innocent civilians.157 This is only the case, however, if 
humanitarian law is analyzed from a consequentialist point of 
view. From a deontological perspective of humanitarian law, a 
teleological interpretation of duress would still be subject to the 
categorical imperative, necessitating that protection of human 
lives not be an end that justifies all means. In other words, the 
possible preservation of innocents cannot be a justification for 
inherently unjust action (such as finding a guiltless man guilty 
of mass murder).  
Judges McDonald, Vohrah, and Li’s opinions apply duress 
as a consequentialist excuse. To determine the Scope of the De-
fense, they (i) compared the harm that will be caused in the fu-
ture by individuals who may use the defense to the harm 
caused by the crimes perpetrated, and (ii) came to the conclu-
sion that this harm is greater than the benefit in excusing Er-
demović due to his lack of choice.  
(2) Judge Cassese’s Separate Opinion 
Judge Cassese disagreed with the majority both in meth-
odology and in result, because after surveying municipal laws 
he found no generally accepted exception to the rule that du-
ress applies in cases of murder, deducing that no such excep-
tion exists as a matter of state practice.158 Judge Cassese then 
analyzed past decisions made by international tribunals, and 
came to the conclusion that four criteria are required for the 
defense of duress to apply: (i) the criminal conduct was perpe-
trated under immediate threat of harm to life or limb; (ii) there 
was no adequate means of averting the evil; (iii) the crime 
committed was not disproportionate to the evil threatened; and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vorah, supra note 
141, at ¶75; Separate Opinion of Judge Li, supra note 140, at ¶8. 
158 Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese, supra note 142, at ¶41. 
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(iv) the situation leading to duress must not have been volun-
tarily brought about by the coerced person.159 
Two interesting facts should be noted before analyzing the 
rest of Judge Cassese’s ruling on duress. First, in only one of 
the international cases, which Cassese cited in his decision, is 
criteria (iii) mentioned.160 According to Judge Cassese’s opin-
ion, only the International Military Tribunal, which tried the 
major war criminals and the NMTs in Nürnberg can truly be 
described as international trials.161 But in neither the trial of 
the major war criminals, nor the Einsatzgruppen judgment, 
nor the Flick case, is the proposition that proportionality is re-
quired for duress to apply raised. Additionally, in the Krupp 
case, the notion of proportionality is raised, but not in connec-
tion with duress, but with necessity.162 Second, these four crite-
ria match the Italian (Judge Cassese’s nationality) provision on 
the defense of duress exactly.163 The similarity between the 
Italian law and Judge Cassese’s determination of the criteria 
required to apply duress in international law, despite the weak 
international precedence supporting this determination, raises 
the suspicion that Judge Cassese’ analysis might have been 
strongly affected by his acquaintance with the Italian interpre-
tation of duress. 
In all fairness to Judge Cassese’s opinion, a report by the 
International Law Commission cites the digest compiled by the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission conducted after the 
Second World War, which concluded that duress required 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Id. at ¶¶ 16, 41. 
160 See Krupp Case, supra note 113, at 1443-1444. 
161 Separate opinion of Judge Cassese, supra note 142, at ¶ 21. This is as 
opposed to some of the trial decisions taken by courts constituted by the vic-
torious powers individually in their respective zones and cited by Judges 
McDonald and Vohrah in their decision. 
162 See Krupp Case, supra note 113, at 1443-1444.  The NMTs were not 
particular about distinguishing between necessity and duress, and used the 
terms interchangeably. However, based on the discussion at the relevant part 
of the opinion, it is possible to deduce that the defense in question was neces-
sity as understood today and not duress. Judge Cassese quoted from other 
post-Second World War cases in his opinion; Separate opinion of Judge 
Cassese, supra note 142, at ¶¶ 23-27; but in none of these cases is there any 
mention of proportionality or ‘the lesser of two evils.’ 
163 McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 141, at ¶59 (quoting the French 
c.p. 54 (1) from the translation provided in the Separate opinion of Judges). 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/4
4. NOAM WIENER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/9/14  5:40 PM 
124 PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION [Vol.  XXVI::2 
“three essential elements” including proportionality.164 To 
prove its case, the International Law Commission cited the 
Einsatzgruppen case, which does not raise the question of pro-
portionality in duress,165 and the arguments of one British ad-
vocate at one of the later trials held in the British held zones.166 
This last source is particularly weak for three reasons. First, as 
Judge Cassese noted in his opinion, these later trials were not 
international trials but rather trials held under the lex forum 
of the trying state.167 Second, this was not the judgment of the 
tribunal, only the argument of prosecutor.168 And third, despite 
the attempt of the International Law Commission to discern, 
from the prosecuting attorney’s remarks, that proportionality is 
a relevant factor, the direct quotation from that case relates to 
murder being inexcusable by duress, not to proportionality as 
an element of the defense.169 Why the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission chose to read proportionality into these 
decisions is not clear. One of two reasons may have guided its 
analysis. First, it may not have been willing to adopt the com-
mon law position that duress simply does not apply to murder, 
but had to contend with this practice of the common law war 
tribunals nonetheless. Or second, as mentioned earlier, the 
NMTs lack of a proper demarcation between duress and neces-
sity, may have lead the International Law Commission to con-
fuse the two.170 
Regardless of the method by which Judge Cassese decided 
that proportionality is a relevant criterion for the determina-
tion of duress, he applied duress as a justification rather than 
an excuse.171 That is because, as explained above, proportional-
ity, or the weighing of different grounds for duty, is the hall-
mark of justifications. Excuses focus on the will of the perpe-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the work of its forty-eighth session, 
May 6—July 26, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/51/10; GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp.  No. 10, at 
40, (1996). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 41. 
167 Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese, supra note 142, at ¶ 21. 
168 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF THE 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, Vol. XV, 173 (1949). 
169 Id. 
170 See supra note 162; see also Ambos, supra note 99, at 1036. 
171 Luis E. Chiesa, Duress, Demanding Heroism and Proportionality: The 
Erdemovic Case and Beyond, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 741, 749 (2008). 
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trator, and are therefore binary – either the perpetrator had 
the capacity to intend to commit the crime or not. Certain 
crimes might require a lower level of intent than others, but 
where, because of some defect in the defendant, the ability to 
apply free will does not exist, there can be no partial intent at-
tributed.  
When Judge Cassese stated that he requires that the act 
committed under duress be the lesser of two evils, he is requir-
ing that even under threat of death, the coerced individual 
choose the lesser evil. In other words, the threat of death, ac-
cording to Judge Cassese’s definition of duress, does not have 
the effect of removing the coerced person’s ability to freely 
choose whether to commit the crime. Subsequently, this is the 
reason that when determining whether duress should apply in 
Erdemović’s case, Judge Cassese considered the question, 
whether the victims of the massacre would have been mur-
dered or not had Erdemović refused to shoot, as pertinent. If 
the death of the victims was inevitable, then the commission of 
the crime is the lesser of the two evils because Erdemović sur-
vived. Had Erdemović not committed the crime, he would have 
also been killed – a greater evil.172  
Judge Cassese’s opinion therefore analyzes duress as a jus-
tification, but is it deontological or consequentialist? On the 
one hand, the language generally associated with consequen-
tialist analysis of justifications (i.e. examining whether punish-
ing the culprit in this situation would motivate or deter behav-
ior of this sort in the future and whether this would increase or 
decrease the general welfare of society) is missing and there-
fore one may be led to believe that Judge Cassese does not ap-
proach the issue from a consequentialist perspective. Moreover, 
Judge Cassese gives great weight to the coerced individual’s 
decision when she is acting under duress, focusing on the 
choices of the perpetrator. On the other hand, the main deter-
mining factor in Judge Cassese’s decision is the consequence of 
the decision, not the grounds according to which it was made, 
i.e. a consequentialist determination. The Scope of the Defense, 
according to Judge Cassese, is directly linked to the Severity of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 One could argue that this point of view is incorrect and that there are 
strong grounds not to kill even when the victim of the killing will die anyway. 
This issue, however, will need to be addressed elsewhere. 
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the Threats. The conclusion is that his analysis is most likely 
consequentialist rather than deontological. To recount - the 
majority views duress as a consequentialist excuse, Judge 
Cassese applies it as a consequentialist justification. Judge 
Stephen presents yet a third alternative. 
 (3) Judge Stephen’s Separate Opinion 
Judge Stephen’s entire opinion revolved around the incon-
sistency between common law’s murder exclusion to the de-
fense of duress,173 and his common sense intuition (backed by 
the law in most civil law jurisdictions) that this exception is in-
coherent with a coherent and justifiable doctrine of duress.174 
Judge Stephen’s disagreement with the majority opinion was 
therefore grounded on two pillars. First, Judge Stephen had a 
strong intuition that murder ought not to be excluded from the 
defense of duress.175 This is referred to as an intuition because 
Judge Stephen did not explain anywhere in his opinion why he 
believes this exclusion to be inapposite. Second, Judge Stephen 
disagreed with Judges McDonald, Vohrah and Li that common 
state practice and the jurisprudence of post-Second World War 
tribunals favors the murder exception to duress.176 
Judge Stephen’s separate opinion is therefore difficult to 
analyze because his decision proceeds concurrently along two 
parallel rationales. On the one hand, the opinion follows an 
implicit notion that duress ought to be a complete defense from 
a substantive point of view. This notion is best exemplified by 
the rhetorical question he posed: 
Were a civilian, going about his lawful business, to be suddenly 
accosted by an armed man and ordered, under threat of immedi-
ate and otherwise unavoidable death and without explanation, 
then and there to kill a total stranger present at the scene and 
against whom he can have no conceivable animus, it would be 
strange justice indeed to deny that civilian the defence of duress. 
Yet if he obeys the order and kills that total stranger what else is 
it, according to the common law, but murder to which duress, his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen, supra note 142, at ¶25. 
174 Id. at ¶26. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at ¶¶ 23-24. 
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only defence, is no defence?177 
On the other hand, most of Judge Stephen’s opinion is ded-
icated to explaining how applying the defense of duress in the 
Erdemović case is correct, not from a substantive standpoint, 
but rather based on the laws of most civil law states and on the 
development of common law.178 
Demonstrating that in Erdemović’s case, duress ought to 
be applicable to murder according to British law (the branch of 
common law Stephen focused on) is very difficult in light of two 
hundred years of precedents pointing in the other direction.179 
It is unnecessary to follow Stephen’s entire reading of British 
precedent on duress in the case of murder; suffice it to say that 
he concluded that Erdemović’s case can be distinguished from 
prior British rulings because unlike previous defendants, 
whose claims for duress have been denied, Erdemović’s choice 
was not ‘who should die?’, but rather whether he should die 
along with the other victims.180 According to Judge Stephen’s 
reading, the strong common law aversion to accepting duress 
as a defense to murder is a moral repulsion to allowing a man 
to choose that one man shall live while another dies. This mor-
al repulsion does not exist, according to Judge Stephen, when 
either one man or both shall die.181 
The very long path that Judge Stephen took as he at-
tempted to distinguish the Erdemović case from former British 
precedence makes gauging the paradigm according to which he 
made his final ruling difficult. More so than the other judges, 
Judge Stephen attempted to demonstrate the existence of 
common state practice regarding duress and to base his deter-
mination of the Scope of the Defense on this common practice. 
If we look beyond this attempt at the core argument that Ste-
phen made (and essentially at the application that he found to 
be common state practice), we will find that he viewed duress 
as a deontological excuse. According to this view, similarly to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Id. at ¶26. 
178 See, e.g., Id. at ¶ 25. 
179 Though not always as conclusively as one would think. In the case of 
the Mignonette mentioned above, the crown pardoned the defendants imme-
diately after the verdict was pronounced. See Simpson, supra note 105, at 
248. 
180 Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen, supra note 142, at ¶53. 
181 Id. at ¶62. 
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the ruling of the Nürnberg tribunal in the Einsatzgruppen tri-
al, a person under duress is incapable of exercising free choice 
and therefore cannot have a mens rea, notwithstanding how 
dire the offense with which he is charged. Thus, the Severity of 
the Threats along determines the applicability of the defense. 
Judge Stephen, alone, applied duress as a deontological excuse. 
F. ERDEMOVIĆ’S DURESS AS A LITMUS TEST FOR THE ICTY 
APPEALS CHAMBER’S ATTITUDE TOWARDS PUNISHMENT 
The logic that claims that exceptions to a rule can very of-
ten help clarify the content of the rule itself is as sound today 
as it was more than 2,000 years ago when it was argued in 
front of the Roman tribunal by Cicero.182 By following the ra-
tionale the tribunal provided when it discussed the situations 
that exclude criminal responsibility, one can get a sense of 
what the tribunal considers to be the basic components of this 
liability.  
In the Erdemović case, the Appeals Chamber was split 
three ways in its presentation of the Scope of duress and its 
application. This split will create great difficulty in arguing du-
ress before future tribunals. The manner in which the tribunal 
is split also makes determining what criminal law paradigm 
guided it when it made its ruling difficult. However, based on 
the tests the majority of the tribunal applied to decide if Erde-
mović is not guilty by reason of the duress he was under, the 
Appeals Chamber appears to have a consequentialist outlook 
on the criminal law process.183 
This consequentialist approach is manifested by the Ap-
peals Chamber’s focus on how its decision will affect future ac-
tors in similar situations and prevent them from participating 
in mass murder, rather than on the culpability and responsibil-
ity of the defendant. Judges McDonald and Vohrah in their 
joint separate opinion and Judge Li in his separate opinion es-
sentially sacrificed Erdemović, notwithstanding his personal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 M. Tulius Cicero, The Speech of M.T. Cicero in Defence of Lucius Cor-
nelius Balbus, 14:32 (C.D. Yonge Trans.) available at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.02.0020:text
=Balb.:chapter=14&highlight=exception. 
183 Judges McDonald, Vorah and Li, and perhaps, but probably not 
Cassese. 
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guilt or his ability to comply with the prohibition, for the sake 
of preventing future combatants from abusing the duress de-
fense. From this perspective, the majority judges’ opinion ex-
emplifies the instrumentalizing of the defendant inherent in 
the consequentialist paradigm. The majority judges did not lin-
ger on the question of Erdemović’s culpability - they did not ask 
whether he was capable of making a free choice. They did not 
ask a less formal question such as one Westen suggests, 
whether Erdemović’s attitude is blameworthy.184 Instead, the 
majority judges asked what the consequences of either a guilty 
or innocent sentence will have on future potential perpetrators. 
Erdemović’s role in actual genocide, and in the judgment, be-
came incidental to the policy the judges decided to advance. In-
cidentally, Erdemović was the defendant before the tribunal, 
but whether he personally had the capacity not to commit the 
crime was irrelevant, in the majority judges’ opinion, when 
compared with the need to deter future genocidaires who might 
try to get away with genocide by claiming duress.  
Thus, the majority opinion demonstrates utilitarian conse-
quentialist justice at its worst –when it decided to acquit or 
convict without regard to the guilt or innocence of the defend-
ant the tribunal essentially conducted a show trial. It is note-
worthy that even according to non-deontological mixed or side-
constraint theories of the kind presented by H.L.A Hart,185 the 
majority opinion is unjust. The mixed retributivist-
consequentialist theories emphasize that once guilt is estab-
lished punishment needs to be also justified by its good conse-
quences. But the side-constraint of these theories is the re-
quirement that these good consequences only be gained by 
punishing the guilty.186 
Had the tribunal applied duress with a deontological crim-
inal justice paradigm in mind, its analysis would have been 
similar to Judge Stephen’s opinion. The judges would have sent 
the case back to the Trial Chamber where the evidence would 
have been examined so that the circumstances surrounding 
Erdemović’s actions would have been ascertained. Had the Tri-
al Chamber indeed found that Erdemović’s depiction of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Westen, supra note 3, at 371. 
185 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, 11-12 (1968). 
186 Id. at 12. 
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facts to be true; his actions would have been excused because 
his decision to perpetrate the crime was not freely made.  
How this precedent will affect future rulings of the ICC re-
quires looking at the definition of Duress in the Rome Statute 
of the ICC again. Because the ICC has not issued, to date, any 
decisions analyzing the defense, one can only speculate as to 
the manner in which it will be applied by the court, and yet the 
wording of Article 31(1)(d) of the Rome Statute foreshadows a 
problematic application of the defense. As it were, the drafters 
of the Statute seemed to conflate duress and necessity by in-
cluding a “lesser evil” element to the defense.187 Or else they 
have adopted a consequentialist approach to duress, which as 
demonstrated above, sacrifices the perpetrator by overlooking 
his culpability to achieve extrinsic ends.  
Article 31(1)(d) defines duress an action as something re-
sulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or 
imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another 
person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid 
this threat, provided that the person does not intend to cause a 
greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.188 
The article permits acting in order to protect not only the 
defendant’s life, but also the life of another person. By remov-
ing the requirement that the person acting under duress is 
himself threatened, the central element that creates the lack of 
free will is removed from the definition of the defense. Because 
the central element of the defense is no longer the inability of 
the defendant to freely exercise his free will due to grave per-
sonal risk, the defense is no longer an excuse, but rather a jus-
tification. In a manner similar to Cassese’s opinion in Erde-
mović, once duress is treated as a justification, inserting a 
proportionality requirement is necessary. This state of affairs 
leaves one wondering why the drafters of the Rome Statute de-
cided to omit creating a duress defense, but created, essential-
ly, two necessity defenses.189 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Ambos, supra note 99, at 1040. 
188 Rome Statute, supra note 34, at Art. 31(1)(d). 
189 For further critique, see Ambos, supra note 99, at 1035-1047. As Am-
bos notes, the defense portion of the Rome Statute is further hampered by a 
conflation of self-defense and necessity within the same section 31(1)(b); Id., 
at 1040. 
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As noted above, international precedent on the application 
of duress is split. While the NMTs defined the defense as a de-
ontological excuse, the majority at the ICTY defined it as a con-
sequentialist excuse. If the judges at the ICC wish to bolster 
the legitimacy of the organization by acting towards the perpe-
trators as ends rather than as means, thereby claiming the 
moral high-ground and refusing to treat them as they treated 
their victims, they will follow in the footsteps of the NMTs and 
refuse to hold responsible individuals who are inculpable be-
cause they had no choice but to commit the crimes because of 
duress. Time will tell.  
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